



FACULTY OF  
BUSINESS &  
ECONOMICS

## Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series

### Working Paper No.17/10

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General Practitioners: A Discrete Choice Experiment  
from the MABEL Longitudinal Study of Doctors

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# **Why Junior Doctors Don't Want to Become General Practitioners: A Discrete Choice Experiment from the MABEL Longitudinal Study of Doctors\***

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**Melbourne Institute Working Paper No. 17/10**

**ISSN 1328-4991 (Print)**

**ISSN 1447-5863 (Online)**

**ISBN 978-0-7340-4228-6**

**October 2010**

\* This work was supported by a National Health and Medical Research Council Health Services Research Grant (454799) and the Commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing. The views in this paper are those of the authors alone. We thank the doctors who gave their valuable time to participate in MABEL, and the other members of the MABEL team for data cleaning and comments on drafts of this paper: Terrence Cheng, Sung-Hee Jeon, Danny Hills, Guyonne Kalb, Daniel Kuehnle, Anne Leahy, Matthew McGrail, Michelle McIsaac, Stefanie Schurer, Durga Shrestha and Wenda Yan. We are also thankful for comments from participants at the Australian Conference of Health Economists 2009. The study was approved by the University of Melbourne Faculty of Business and Economics Human Ethics Advisory Group (Ref. 0709559) and the Monash University Standing Committee on Ethics in Research Involving Humans (Ref. CF07/1102 – 2007000291). Most of the MABEL data is available to researchers in anonymised form see [mabel.org.au](http://mabel.org.au).

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## **Abstract**

A number of studies suggest there is an over-supply of specialists and an under-supply of GPs in many developed countries. Previous econometric studies of specialty choice from the US suggest that a number of factors play a role, including expected future earnings, educational debt, and having predictable working hours. Given endogeneity issues in revealed preference studies, a stated-preference approach is warranted. This paper presents results from a discrete-choice experiment completed by a sample of 532 junior doctors in 2008 before they choose a specialty training program. This was conducted as part of the first wave of the MABEL (Medicine in Australia: Balancing Employment and Life) longitudinal survey of doctors. We include key job attributes such as future earnings and hours worked, but also allow the choice to be influenced by academic research opportunities, continuity of care and the amount of procedural work. Interactions of attributes with doctor characteristics, including gender, educational debt, and personality traits are also examined. We find the income/working hours trade-offs estimated from our discrete choice model are close to the actual wages of senior specialists, but much higher than those of senior GPs. In a policy simulation we find that increasing GPs' earnings by \$50,000, increasing opportunities for procedural or academic work can increase the number of junior doctors choosing General Practice by between 8 and 16 percentage points, approximately 212 to 376 junior doctors per year. The results can inform policymakers looking to address unbalanced supply of doctors across specialties.

**JEL-Classification:** C9, I11, J24

**Keywords:** Junior doctors, discrete choice experiment, specialty choice

## 1. Introduction

Labour markets for doctors are characterised by imperfections such as regulated wage rates and barriers to entry. These imperfections can contribute to an inefficient supply of doctors across alternative specialties. Primary care, particularly in the US, is often regarded as providing lower earnings and status than other specialties, and so the number of specialists in many countries often grows faster than the number of primary care physicians (AIHW 2009). The allocation and control of funded specialty training places often favours the non-primary care specialties, and this is further exacerbated by growing sub-specialisation. Data from the UK shows only one quarter of medical graduates aspire to being general practitioners (GPs) although GPs comprise around one half of the senior physician workforce (Lambert et al 2006). In Australia, a retrospective study of cohorts from a large Australian medical school (Joyce and McNeil 2006) showed a marked decline in the proportion of medical graduates working in general practice, from 52% in the 1980 cohort to 33% in the 1995 cohort.

Studies of the factors influencing specialty choice have examined how wage differences between family physicians and specialists drive specialty choice (Sloan, 1970) and can lead to an excess of specialists (Lasser et al 2008; Bodenheimer et al 2007). Although earnings differences between specialties are an issue, other attributes of work/life balance and intrinsic job attributes also influence choice of specialty. US studies have used revealed-preference (RP) data on physicians' actual specialty choices (Hurley 1991, Thornton 2000) and preference ranking for senior medical students (Nicholson 2002, Dorsey et al, 2003). The results have shown that expected future income (Hurley 1991, Thornton 2000, Nicholson 2002), 'controllable lifestyle' (Dorsey et al 2003) and educational debt (Thornton 2000, Nicholson 2002) all play important roles. An Australian study (Harris et al 2005) asked specialist trainees to rate the importance of a number of attributes in influencing their own choice of specialty. They found that only 16% of doctors rate 'financial prospects' of the specialty as important.

The aim of this paper is to provide evidence on the preferences of junior doctors for the different attributes of specialties using a large representative sample of Australian

postgraduate doctors who have not yet entered a specialist training program. We use our results to simulate policy changes to increase the number of junior doctors choosing general practice. This paper provides the first discrete choice experiment study to investigate this issue.

The paper adds to the literature in several ways. An important issue in using revealed preference data on specialty choice is the potential endogeneity bias in estimating the effect of income and other factors on physician specialty choices. Income may be correlated with unobservable factors (eg prestige). Educational debt is included in many models but does not always produce expected results. For example, in Thornton (2000) educational debt is positively associated with choosing General Practice (a lower remunerated specialty). This may be indicative of educational debt being correlated with unobservable factors associated with the choice of General Practice. Other studies ask doctors rate the importance of a list factors after they have chosen their specialty may suffer from ex post justification bias (eg Harris et al 2005).

These drawbacks of RP studies of specialty choice suggest a role for stated-preference studies. Using a stated preference discrete-choice experiment (DCE) we can independently vary attributes of specialties when presenting respondents with choice scenarios. Furthermore, the attributes included in the experiment can be presented as exogenous. Using a DCE approach also allows us to analyse the effects of attributes that may be unobserved in RP data, but are nevertheless highly influential in specialty choice.

DCE's have become widely used in health economics, although there are still relatively few applications of the technique in analysing healthcare labour markets (LaGuarde and Blauw 2009). In this area, most papers have studied job choice, especially for GPs (eg Scott 2001, Ubach et al 2003) or rural/urban issues (eg Kolstad 2010).

## 2. Methods

### 2.1 The MABEL Survey

The “Medicine in Australia: Balancing Employment and Life (MABEL)” study investigates workforce participation patterns and their determinants using a longitudinal survey of Australian doctors. All Australian doctors undertaking clinical work in 2008 (n=54,750) were invited to participate, and annual waves of data collections will be undertaken until at least 2011. Data are collected by paper or optional online version of a questionnaire, with content tailored to four sub-groups of clinicians: general practitioners, specialists, specialists in training, and hospital non-specialists. The survey methods are discussed in detail in Joyce et al (2010).

The survey included discrete choice experiments tailored to the different types of doctors answering the survey. In this paper we report on the results from the discrete choice experiment administered to hospital non-specialists which includes doctors-in-training.

We define our sample as junior doctors who have completed their undergraduate medical degree but have not enrolled in a specialty training program or as a GP registrar. Our definition comprises first year interns, and the first three years as a hospital (or resident) medical officer (HMO/RMO). In 2007 (the most recent available data) there were 4,774 interns and HMOs (or RMOs) in Australia (AIHW 2009). Figure 1 is a stylised illustration of the doctor training system in Australia. In this study we are interested in the groups of doctors represented by the shaded sections.

[Insert Figure 1 about here]

### 2.2 The Choice Model

Our model arises from a job-characteristics approach to choice of specialty. This approach has previously been used to analyse job choice for GPs (eg Scott 2001) and is based on a random utility model. We specify an indirect utility function where

utility for respondent  $i$  from choosing specialty  $j$  in choice situation  $t$  is a linear combination of attributes of specialty  $j$  and an idiosyncratic error term  $\varepsilon_{ijt}$ .

$$U_{ijt} = X_{ijt}\gamma + \varepsilon_{ijt} \quad (1)$$

Where  $X_{ijt}$  is a vector containing the attributes of alternative specialties. The model is estimated by using observed data on doctors' hypothetical choices between two alternative specialties, specialty 1 and specialty 2 ( $j=1,2$ ). This is modelled by assuming  $\varepsilon_{ijt}$  is type 1 extreme value (Gumbel) distributed giving the probability that doctor  $i$  chooses specialty 1 according to the logistic distribution function:

$$\Pr(U_{i1t} - U_{i2t} > 0) = \frac{\exp(X_{i1t}\gamma)}{\exp(X_{i1t}\gamma) + \exp(X_{i2t}\gamma)} \quad (2)$$

Recent studies (Ryan and Skatun 2004, King et al 2007) have argued 'forced choice' DCEs are sometimes inappropriate, and that DCEs should include an 'opt-out' or 'neither' option. For the population we investigate in this paper, we argue a forced choice *is* appropriate. Junior doctors in Australia are all likely to choose a specialty program in which to enroll, and so we do not include an 'opt-out' choice in this experiment.

Though we examine specialty choice, we use an unlabelled design with attributes relevant to all specialties. Our choice of an unlabelled experimental design for the choice experiment may be criticized as less realistic than a labelled design (Kruijshaar et al 2009). However, studies in the health economics (de Bekker-Grob et al 2010) and environmental economics (Blamey et al 2000) literature have demonstrated labeled designs can reduce the attention respondents give to attribute levels, with up to 24% of respondents choosing based on choice labels alone, suggesting that they choose specialties based on unobserved attributes. An unlabelled design forces respondents to focus on the attributes in the experiment.

Table 1 lists the attributes and levels included in the vector  $X$  in equations (1) and (2). The first two attributes *Earnings* and *Change in hours* are specified as continuous variables, the other variables represent dummy coded attribute levels.

The first four attributes can be regarded as ‘work-life’ attributes in the sense that they affect the doctor’s out-of-work life, including consumption and leisure time. The final three attributes can be regarded as ‘intrinsic’ specialty attributes, as they relate to characteristics of the doctor’s experiences in the workplace. The attributes and levels used in the questionnaire were validated with face-to-face pilots with a group of 12 junior doctors.

[Insert Table 1 about here]

### Work-life attributes

The income attribute allows us to measure marginal willingness-to-pay (or willingness-to-accept) for changes in all other attributes and especially the valuation of reducing working hours. Working hours is a key attribute of any job and is important from a policy perspective because there is a trend towards working fewer hours in Australia (Scott 2007). We also included on-call arrangements since this is a key issue for most doctors. Reasonable on-call, weekend and after-hours duties have been found to be important job characteristics, with lower out-of-hours workloads being preferred (Scott, 2001; Ubach et al., 2003).

All of the attributes represent characteristics of alternative specialties in the future. For the earnings attribute we must take into account that junior doctors may expect large increases in their annual earnings over the first few years of work. For this reason we specify ‘expected average annual earnings’ to make the choice plausible for respondents. There is no nationally representative data on doctors earnings in Australia. Instead we chose the level of the earnings attribute by checking through classifieds for physician jobs across a variety of specialties on various association and hiring agencies websites and using these salary ranges to calculate our bounds. We allow for a fairly wide range of future earnings to reflect the GP option as a specialty, we chose: 150,000, 200 ,000 and 250,000 Australian Dollars.

For the change in hours worked attribute, we chose 10% decrease, no change, 10% increase. This was chosen to match approximately the variation in average total hours worked per week across different specialties (AIHW, 2009).

We defined four levels for the on-call attribute: 1 in 10, frequently called out; 1 in 4, infrequently called out; 1 in 4, frequently called out; 1 in 2, frequently called out. With these attribute levels, we wanted to reflect two dimensions of the on-call attribute (1) the official on-call arrangements (1 in 4), and (2) the frequency of call outs on each on-call night. We obtained the on-call terminology from classified advertisements. The issue of call out frequency has not been formally addressed quantitatively. We used two levels for this attribute, frequently and infrequently.

In addition to hours worked and on-call, the final work/life attribute is control over hours. Harris et al. (2005) found that flexible work hours were important in choosing a specialty, and Dorsey et al (2003) found that controllable lifestyle was increasingly important in explaining physician specialty preference in the US. For control over hours, we have the following 3 levels: High, medium, low. These levels were chosen to reflect the degree of control that doctors-in-training will have over their hours in their specialty, and we wanted this range to be broad to account for the different settings in which control over hours will vary considerably. For example, specialists in their own private practice probably have more control over their hours than specialists in public hospitals.

#### Intrinsic job attributes

The final three attributes can be regarded as ‘intrinsic’ specialty attributes because they relate only to qualitative aspects of the time spent at work. The first of these attributes is academic/research opportunities. The AMWAC (2005) found that one of the three most influential factors in choice of specialty was the intellectual content of the specialty (73.3%). This attribute measures the extent of preference for such opportunities and we include three levels: Excellent, average, poor. There is some evidence that specialists are more involved in teaching and research than GPs (Joyce et al 2009).

The second intrinsic attribute is continuity of care. Stokes et al. (2005) conducted a three-country study of the importance of continuity of care among family physicians/general practitioners, and found that all place a high value on being able to provide continuity of care to their patients. For continuity of care, we have the

following 3 levels: Regularly see patients more than once; sometimes see patients more than once, rarely see patients more than once. These levels are likely to capture two components: (1) differences between specialties, for example, GPs having a higher rate of continuity than, for example, anaesthesiology, and (2) work place arrangements, where, for example, working in a hospital is likely to be associated with less continuity, while working in a private practice is likely to be associated with more continuity.

Finally, AMWAC (2005) found that opportunity for procedural work was among the most influential determinants of choice of specialty. Procedural work provides the opportunity to use technical skills, and can be the source of more interesting work, depending on the specialty and the type of procedure. For opportunities for procedural work, we have the following 3 levels: Enough, some, none. The levels include the spectrum ranging from GP's, many of whom do only minor procedural work to surgical specialists, who do mostly procedural work.

### 2.3 Experimental Design

We use an approach to developing D-optimal designs as described by Zwerina et al (1996) and Carlsson and Martinsson (2003).

There are seven attributes, six with three levels, and one with four levels giving a full factorial of  $3^6 \times 4^1 = 2916$  possible choices. For the pilot survey and then for the main survey, we generated a fractional factorial of 36 choice sets containing 72 alternatives.

An efficient design was generated for the pilot by minimizing the D-error, a function of the covariance matrix ( $\Sigma$ ) of the  $\beta$ 's in the logit model.

$$D - \text{error} = |\Sigma|^{1/K} \quad (3)$$

where  $K$  is the number of  $\beta$ 's to be estimated. D-errors are lower with better priors since  $\Sigma$  depends on the parameter values, and thus the better the estimates, the better the approximation of the covariance matrix that is used to generate the efficient design.

We used a SAS program (Zwerina et al 1996) to search for the best design using a modified Fedorov candidate-set-search algorithm. We used a full factorial candidate set, since this did not increase running time and provided a fully balanced and orthogonal candidate set. The best design among those generated was found by comparing D-errors and choosing the one with the lowest D-error that also had the most “sensible” choice pairs. For the pilot survey, we set our priors to zero, because we had no prior information.

In the SAS program, the betas are estimated on dummy variables of each level. Respondents were randomly allocated one of the four blocks of choice sets in the questionnaire. The data collected from the pilot surveys provided prior estimates of the  $\beta$ 's for use in the design of the main experiment. Many of the coefficients were statistically significantly different from zero.

The process outlined above was repeated for the main survey to find a design that minimized the D-error using the prior values of  $\beta$  estimated from the pilot survey data. The DCE had a D-error of 0.25.

We tried to avoid designs with too many attribute combinations that respondents may not have found very realistic. For example, regular continuity of care may be associated with GP's, but not with procedural specialties, and so designs in which these were frequently paired to describe one specialty were discarded in favour of designs that paired these attribute levels less frequently.

An example of the choice experiment is given in Figure 2.

[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]

## 2.4 Econometric estimation

Equation (2) defines a logit model assuming  $\varepsilon_{i1t}$  and  $\varepsilon_{i2t}$  are independently and identically distributed for all respondents  $i$  and across all choice situations  $t$ . It is likely there will be correlation between the  $\varepsilon$ 's for the choice situations faced by the same respondent so we correct standard errors for clustering within respondents.

We follow recent literature (Hall et al 2006, Hole 2008) and estimate mixed logit models which allow for unobserved heterogeneity in the coefficients of the model. Equation (2) is extended by integrating the choice probability over the normal density:

$$\Pr(U_{i1t} - U_{i2t} > 0) = \int \frac{\exp(X_{i1t}\gamma_i)}{\exp(X_{i1t}\gamma_i) + \exp(X_{i2t}\gamma_i)} \phi(\gamma) d\gamma \quad (4)$$

The model is then estimated by maximum simulated likelihood to recover the means and standard deviations of the joint distribution of coefficients  $\phi(\gamma)$ . We use 200 halton draws in the Stata 'mixlogit' command (Hole 2007a) for the estimations. Our aim here is to test which attributes have substantial preference heterogeneity as represented by the standard deviations of the estimated coefficient distributions. These models often provide a better fit to the data, and provide richer information on preferences than the standard logit model.

Our baseline model is a mixed logit with all coefficients normally distributed except for the earnings variable, for which the coefficient is fixed. We also estimate a mixed logit model with all coefficients normally distributed (Hole 2008) and a heteroscedastic extreme value model (Bhat 1995) to allow for scale heterogeneity (Flynn et al 2010) as robustness checks.

## 2.5 Interaction Terms

We use interaction terms between the specialty attributes  $X_{ijt}$  and selected individual characteristics to test three specific hypotheses. We first test hypotheses 1 and 2 together and then we test hypothesis 3, as the latter requires a large number of interaction terms.

*Hypothesis 1: DITs with high levels of educational debt will value future earnings more highly*

This hypothesis is informed by the US literature on specialty choice which finds that educational debt is an important factor (Thornton 2000, Nicolson 2002). In the light of these findings it is important to see if educational debt also plays a role in a country like Australia, where university education is more heavily subsidized.

To test the hypothesis we interact the level of educational debt with the earning attribute in the multinomial logit model. The relevant question in MABEL is: “What is the total level of financial debt that you currently have as a result of your medical education and training? (Give dollar amount; include HECS debt, other debt associated with training and living expenses)”. The Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) is the main government-run student loan and repayment system in Australia. We use the continuous debt variable as an interaction as higher debt levels are likely to have larger effects on valuation of earnings.

*Hypothesis 2: Female doctors and doctors with children will value flexibility of hours worked more highly*

Harris et al (2005) find that “Factors of particular importance to women, compared with men, were “appraisal of domestic circumstances” (odds ratio, 1.9), “hours of work” (OR, 1.8) and “opportunity to work flexible hours” (OR, 2.6)” in a retrospective study of specialty choice. Flexible hours may be more important for women is that they often take a majority role in childcare. As MABEL also has detailed information on domestic circumstances, including children in the family, we also test for the effect of having children in the family (for male and female doctors).

To test this hypothesis we interact two dummy variables: “Female” and “Children” (=1 if the doctor reports having any children) with the “Change in hours” and “Control over hours” attributes.

### *Hypothesis 3: Personality affects work/life preferences for DITs*

Personality is of increasing interest to economists looking to explain individuals' employment and life outcomes (Borghans et al 2008). One example is that extroverted workers may select into jobs with more social interactions (Kruger and Schkade 2008). We might expect extroverted doctors to prefer continuity of care, which require repeated interactions with patients and good communication skills.

Information on the 'big five' personality characteristics (openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism) was collected in Wave 2 of MABEL (the year after the DCE) and was merged back into Wave 1 for returning respondents (personality data is available for approximately 58 % of respondents in our sample). We interact de-meanded and standardized variables for each of the 'big five' characteristics with all attributes in the DCE as we have no prior expectation about which attributes may be most sensitive to personality differences.

### **3. Results**

The MABEL response rate for "hospital non-specialists" is 16.45% from a sampling frame of 8,820 giving 1,451 respondents. After excluding pilot respondents and CMOs we have 536 respondents of which 532 answer at least one DCE question. The estimation sample is 4808 observations from 532 junior doctors. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on some basic variables available in the MABEL survey data as well as variables used for interactions. We can see the sample is young (29 years old on average) and a small majority (62%) are female. These figures show MABEL respondents are slightly younger and more respondents are female compared to the most comprehensive estimate of the population age (30 years) and gender (52% female) (AIHW 2009). Compared to older, fully qualified GPs and specialists, average income is quite low, and hours worked about 3 hours/week higher (Joyce et al 2010). A small proportion of doctors have children (12%), and the mean educational debt is \$27,710.

[Insert Table 2 about here]

Table 3 reports estimates for the MNL and MXL models with standard errors clustered by respondent. For both models we present the Bayesian Information Criterion ( $BIC = -2\log L + k \cdot \ln(n)$ ) where  $\log L$  is the log-likelihood,  $k$  is the number of parameters estimated and  $n$  is the number of observations.

[Insert Table 3 about here]

In the MNL model, the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 1% for all attributes apart from “Continuity of care - Regularly”. The estimated coefficients all have the expected sign, and for the attributes with three dummy-coded levels, utility is estimated to be monotonically increasing in the attribute. Doctors prefer lower hours of work, high control over hours, low on-call, excellent academic opportunities, and high levels of procedural work.

The MXL model coefficient means are all approximately 50% greater than the coefficient point-estimates in the MNL model. All but one of the coefficient distributions have substantial and statistically significant standard deviations. This suggests that there is substantial preference heterogeneity over the attributes. The lower BIC in the MXL indicates this model is preferred in terms of model ‘fit’.

The estimated standard deviations of each coefficient in the MXL model can tell us the amount of preference heterogeneity across the different attributes. Most attributes have relatively substantial standard deviations. The “On-Call – 1 in 10” attribute coefficient has a small standard deviation which is not statistically significant. This indicates most doctors have similar preferences over this attribute, in this case it has a positive effect on utility; doctors prefer less on-call time. “Change in hours (%)” also has a relatively small standard deviation (<40% of the coefficient mean) indicating relatively little variation in preferences over working fewer hours.

Marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP) values, the marginal rate of substitution between each attribute and the earnings attribute, are also calculated. We can interpret these values as the sum of money (in terms of annual income) a doctor would give up in order to gain a unit increase in the attribute. A negative value represents an attribute with a negative effect on utility and can be interpreted as the

sum of money the doctor would be willing to accept (in terms of annual income) to compensate for a unit increase in the attribute.

[Insert Table 4 about here]

Table 4 presents MWTP values for models 1 and 2. Standard errors are calculated by the delta method (Hole, 2007b). The two models have very similar mean values for most of the attributes, we concentrate on the mean MWTP for the MXL model. First we discuss the dummy-coded attributes then we return to a detailed analysis of the change in hours attribute. In general all the specialty attributes have large but plausible monetary values according to our estimates. An exception is the “On-Call” attribute which has very high valuations, outside the range of the earnings attribute (in the case of “On-Call - 1 in 2”). A consistent result is that the higher (‘better’) level of each attribute is valued less over the medium level, than the medium level is valued over the lowest level. This finding is consistent with diminishing returns to attributes.

Both work-life and intrinsic specialty attributes have substantial valuations. We estimate that doctors are willing to accept a \$53,000 decrease in annual earnings to have “Control over hours – Medium” rather than “Control over hours – Low”. A slightly higher valuation (\$62,000) is given to having some procedural work compared to none. Attributes with lower valuations are “Academic opportunities” and “Continuity of care”. Both of these attributes have the lower levels valued at \$33,000-\$36,000.

The “Change in hours” attribute suggests doctors will trade-off hours worked per week at \$4,109 for a 1% change or \$41,088 for a 10% change. Using the figure for average hours worked from Table 2 we can see 10% = 5 hours. We can convert this monetary value into a hypothetical marginal wage rate. We have  $\$41,088 / 52 = \$790.41$  for a change of 5 hours per week, so we have  $\$790.41 / 5 = \$158.08$  per hour. We can interpret this as the wage at which the average doctor would be prepared to work an extra hour.

As the MABEL data includes information on earnings and hours for specialists and GPs, we can compare the wage rate implied by the DCE with the actual hourly wages

of specialists and GPs. Cheng et al (2010) show that the average wage for a GP is \$87.10 and for a specialist \$135.53. The marginal wage rate implied by the DCE is slightly higher than the actual wage rates earned by specialists.

Two additional models were estimated as robustness checks: a mixed logit model allowing the earnings coefficient to be normally distributed and an heteroscedastic extreme value model. The MWTP values calculated from are both very similar to the baseline mixed logit results in model (2). Results of these models are omitted for brevity.

### *Predicted probability analysis and policy simulation*

To learn more about the policy implications of the results we conduct a predicted probability analysis (Lancsar and Louviere 2008) and policy simulation. This involves first a simulation of the model (ie calculating predicted probabilities for each choice) for a plausible real life choice between alternative specialties. Secondly, we simulate the model after unilateral changes in attributes for one of the alternative specialties. These changes in attributes can represent government policy changes.

Due to the shortage of GPs in Australia (AMWAC 2005), and internationally (Bodenheimer et al 2007) we choose to simulate the choice of “General Practitioner” versus the choice of “Specialist”. For the baseline simulation, we use MABEL data to inform the attribute levels for the two alternative choices. Where we quote figures in the following text, they are the raw means of the corresponding variable presented in Table 5.

For the earnings and hours attributes we have direct measures in MABEL. In terms of gross earnings, specialists earn on average \$334,937 and GPs earn on average \$183,067, a difference of \$151,870. For the simulation we set the difference between the two alternatives to be \$100,000, the maximum difference in earnings between alternative specialties in the choice experiment.

For hours worked per week (not including on-call), specialists work 45.4 hours and GPs 38.8 hours, a difference of 6.6 hours. For the simulation we choose a 17% difference, as 17% of the GPs 38.8 hours is 6.6 hours.

Evidence from three MABEL variables shows that compared to GPs, specialists are more likely to be dissatisfied with their hours of work (28% vs 17%), agree that they can't take time off when they want to (43 % vs 39%), and have unpredictable hours (44% vs 21%). Using this evidence in the simulation, we set "Control over hours" to be "Medium" for GPs and "Low" for specialists.

As GPs see the same patient for multiple medical problems, and due to the continuous/ongoing nature of primary care for chronic disease and family planning, GPs provide more continuity of care to their patients than Specialists. In the simulation, we set "Continuity of care" to be "Sometimes" for Specialists and "Regularly" for GPs. For "Academic opportunities" there is some evidence in Australia (Joyce et al 2009) that more specialists than GPs are involved in research (15% vs 1%), so we set this attribute to "Average" for specialists and "Poor" for GPs.

Using the relevant MABEL question we find that on average GPs are on-call 1 in 7.7 and specialists 1 in 5.9. To relate these to the ratios used in the DCE attribute, for the simulation we choose On-call to be "1 in 10" for GPs and "1 in 4" for specialists.

Table 6 presents the attribute levels for the simulation and the predicted probabilities for four simulations of the model. The base case predicts that 46% of doctors will choose the "GP" option and 54% will choose "Specialist". The final three rows of the table show how unilateral changes in three selected attributes for the "GP" alternative affect the predicted probabilities.

We can see how increasing procedural work to "Some" has the largest effect on choice probabilities, increasing the number of doctors choosing "GP" from 46% to 62%. Increasing earnings by \$50,000 has a slightly smaller effect, increasing the proportion choosing general practice to 58%. Giving GPs "Average" instead of "Poor" academic opportunities increases the proportion by only eight percentage points to 55%. The ranking of the effects of these different attributes corresponds to

their ranking according to willingness-to-pay (see Table 4, \$65,874, \$50,000 and \$35,019).

Tables 7 and 8 present results for MNL models with interaction terms informed by the three hypotheses in section 2.5. Table 7 presents results where “educational debt”, “female” and “children” are used as interactions. Table 8 presents results where the personality variables are used. We discuss the results in terms of the three hypotheses.

*Hypothesis 1: Doctors with high levels of educational debt will value future earnings more highly*

The coefficient on the interaction between educational debt and earnings is statistically significant at 10%, giving some suggestion of an effect, if imprecisely estimated. The earnings coefficient is 0.00869 and the educational debt interaction is 0.00004. Educational debt is measured in thousands of dollars so a debt of \$27,000 (the sample mean) increases the earnings coefficient by 0.00103 or 12%.

*Hypothesis 2: Female doctors and doctors with children will value flexibility of hours worked more highly*

The effects of the “female” and “children” dummy variables are all statistically insignificant at conventional levels. F-tests for joint significance of both groups of interactions also fails to reach statistical significance.

*Hypothesis 3: Personality affects work/life preferences for DITs*

The five personality variables interacted with all 13 attribute coefficients produces 65 additional coefficients. We initially estimated this model and then ‘tested down’ the model. Groups of interaction terms were removed for each attribute or personality trait if no individual coefficient was significant at 5% and the coefficients were jointly insignificant at 10%.

The results of the model after ‘testing down’ are in Table 8. ‘Agreeableness’ broadly measures politeness, kindness and forgiving nature. The results suggest that agreeable doctors value earnings less, have stronger preferences for control over their hours, but weaker preferences for less on-call time. Openness reduces the preference

for control over hours but increases the preference for less on-call working whereas the 'extraversion' trait only has a statistically significant effect on the procedural work coefficient. The preference for 'enough' procedural work is reduced to near zero by a one standard-deviation increase in extraversion. The results suggest neurotic doctors value earnings less, control over hours more, continuity of care more and procedural work less.

#### **4. Discussion**

This study shows that a range of work-life and intrinsic job attributes influence choice of specialty for junior doctors. The results suggest doctors would be prepared to sacrifice substantial proportions of their annual income (20 to 25% based on an annual income of \$200,000) for improvements in control over working hours and opportunities to do procedural work. The most highly valued attribute is time spent On-Call, where avoiding being on call every other day had a valuation nearly twice as high as any other attribute (approximately 50% of annual income).

Our finding that the average hourly wage implied by our coefficient estimates (\$158.03) is a similar magnitude to the actual average hourly wage of specialists in MABEL (\$135.53, Cheng et al 2010) adds credibility to our results. It also provides evidence of a gap between the earnings expectations of doctors and the average hourly wage of GPs (\$87.10). The earnings gap is a common explanation for oversupply of specialists and undersupply of GPs (Bodenheimer et al 2007).

One caveat to this finding is that in interpreting these values we must recognize how the choice of levels for the earnings attribute could influence estimated valuations (Skjoldborg and Gyrd-Hansen 2003). As we have chosen a relatively wide range for earnings (\$150,000 to \$250,000), we may expect this to provide lower valuations for earnings, or equivalently high monetary valuations of other attributes, including hours worked. However, our choice of levels was informed by evidence, and also relate to expected future earnings, and hence the relatively wide range.

The simulations can be used to see how changes in attributes of GP working conditions may influence the future GP workforce. Our simulation predicts a baseline

probability of choosing 'GP' of 39% that rises by 16 percentage points with an increase in procedural work or 12 percentage points for a 1/3 (\$50,000) increase in earnings. Increasing academic opportunities to 'Average' increases the probability 9 percentage points. Data from the Australian Medical Training Review Panel 2010 (Medical Training Review Panel 2010) shows that in 2009 there were 2,352 junior doctors commencing the second year of postgraduate training in Australia. In the same year, there were 938 first-year GP trainee positions available, projected to increase to 1200 by 2014 (RACGP 2010). An increase of 9, 12, or 16 percentage points as suggested by our simulation is equivalent to 212, 282 or 376 extra doctors choosing to enroll as GP registrars every year.

Previous revealed preference studies from the US have suggested educational debt influences specialty choice through a preference for higher earnings (Thornton 2000, Nicolson 2002). Our results give some weak support to this hypothesis in a different context where educational debt is not as high. In contrast, we have not been able to corroborate previous research from Australia suggesting female doctors or doctors with children have a higher valuation of flexible working hours and shorter working hours (Harris et al 2005). As only 12% of doctors in our sample have children, these family reasons may be less important for junior doctors.

This paper is unique among DCEs concerned with medical labour markets in allowing measures of personality traits to affect the valuation of attributes, and the impact of personality on specialty choice. Our finding that extraverted doctors have a much lower (or zero) valuation of procedural work is related to the finding that extraverted workers self-select into jobs with more social interactions (Krueger and Schkade 2008). This implies that extraverted doctors are more likely to select general practice as a specialty. However we did not find the expected interaction between extraversion and continuity of care. The finding that neurotic and agreeable doctors have a lower preference for earnings matches with the conclusions from a study which finds both neurotic and agreeable individuals suffer an earnings penalty compared to other workers (Mueller and Plug 2006).

In addition to the average valuations of specialty attributes and interactions with observable characteristics, this paper also provides information about unobservable

heterogeneity in doctors' valuations of attributes using the mixed logit model (Hall et al 2006, Hole 2008). The results show wide variation in the marginal utilities of most specialty attributes. Exceptions are two of the work-life attributes, on-call and change in hours worked, which show less variation. This is intuitive, as we might expect that most doctors would prefer less on-call and shorter hours, but only some doctors will value intrinsic specialty attributes such as academic opportunities and procedural work highly. Policies affecting the valuations of some attributes (eg hours worked) will affect the specialty choices of all doctors to a similar extent, whereas policies to change intrinsic specialty attributes such as procedural work or academic opportunities will influence all doctors but with a wide range of different responses, as some doctors will not react at all, whilst others will react to a much greater degree.

A drawback of our research is that we rely on a stated-preference approach. Future research could include using revealed preference data on junior doctors choices together with a calibrated choice experiment on a sample of these doctors.

This paper has policy implications for addressing the shortage of GPs in Australia (AMWAC 2005). Firstly, our findings illustrate the importance of earnings in determining specialty choice. The finding that our estimates of doctors' valuation of their future desired wages is much higher than GPs' current wages, and close to the actual wages of specialists, suggests that addressing the GP/specialist earnings differential could be an effective policy solution. This could be achieved in Australia through a rise in the existing fee-for-service payments to GPs or through introducing pay-for-performance schemes on top of the existing payments (Scott et al 2010).

Secondly, we show how non-pecuniary factors can compensate for earnings differences in choice of specialty. Our results predict that increasing procedural work or academic opportunities for GPs could have a similar effect as increasing earnings by \$50,000, and increase the number of doctors choosing to train as GPs by between 212 and 376 per year. The Primary Health Care Research Evaluation and Development strategy was put in place by the Australian Government in 2000 to try and increase academic activity within general practice, and the importance of academic departments of general practice has also been noted in the USA (Newton & DuBard, 2006). Academic opportunities for GPs may be improved through GP 'Super

Clinics' linked to Universities (Dart et al 2010). Our findings highlight the importance of such initiatives for recruitment to the general practice workforce.

The reality that much of general practice is non-procedural (Baron, 2010) sits uncomfortably with our finding that young doctors prefer more procedural work. Doctors' preference for procedural work may be related to the fact that fee-for-service payment models generally remunerate procedures better than non-procedural activity. In recent years in Australia, many GPs have ceased traditional areas of procedural practice, such as obstetrics, and it may be that strategies to better support these activities (for example, changed medical indemnity insurance arrangements) would enhance the attractiveness of general practice. Somewhat ironically, Australian GPs in rural areas often undertake more procedural work than their metropolitan colleagues, and this feature could be used to enhance recruitment into these regions, which have long suffered from workforce shortages.

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Figure 1: Doctor training in Australia




Figure 2: Example of the DCE preamble and question

*Please read the following:*

- Imagine that you are choosing a specialty in which to work, and you have the choice between two specialties, A and B.
- Everything about the two specialties is the same, except for the characteristics shown in the tables below.
- Even if you would not choose either specialty, we would like you to state which you think is better.

9. Which specialty (A or B) would you prefer?

	Specialty A	Specialty B
Expected average annual earnings	\$150,000	\$200,000
Change in total hours worked	10% decrease	No change
On-call arrangements	1 in 4, infrequently called out	1 in 10, frequently called out
Control over hours	Medium	Low
Academic/Research opportunities	Average	Poor
Continuity of care	Sometimes see patients more than once	Rarely see patients more than once
Opportunities for procedural work	None	None

Prefer Specialty A       Prefer Specialty B

Table 1: Specialty attributes and levels

Specialty attribute	Levels
Expected average annual earnings	\$150,000
	\$200,000*
	\$250,000
Change in total hours worked	10% more
	The same*
	10% less
Control over hours	Low
	Medium*
	High
On-call arrangements	1 in 2
	1 in 4*
	1 in 4 – infrequently called out
	1 in 10
Opportunities for procedural work	None
	Some*
	Enough
Academic/Research opportunities	Poor
	Average*
	Excellent
Continuity of care (see patients more than once)	Rarely
	Sometimes*
	Regularly

Notes: \* indicates reference category

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

	Obs	Mean	S.D.
Age	528	28.782	4.643
Female	532	0.615	0.487
Children (>0)	532	0.124	0.330
Educational Debt ('000 AUD)	532	27.710	35.226
Income (Gross AUD per year)	286	73161	38391
Hours/week	476	50.046	11.613
Position:			
Intern	532	0.180	0.385
HMO yr 1	532	0.306	0.461
HMO yr 2	532	0.299	0.458
HMO yr 3	532	0.214	0.411

Table 3: MNL and MXL model results

Attribute	(1) MNL	(2) MXL	
	Coeff. (S.E.)	Coeff. (S.E.)	S.D. (S.E.)
Earnings (\$'000)	0.010*** (0.001)	0.015*** (0.001)	
Change in hours (%)	-0.040*** (0.003)	-0.061*** (0.006)	-0.024** (0.009)
Control hours - High	0.206*** (0.057)	0.302*** (0.086)	0.634*** (0.166)
Control hours - Low	-0.525*** (0.053)	-0.777*** (0.081)	-0.533*** (0.152)
On-Call - 1 in 10	0.713*** (0.070)	1.056*** (0.111)	0.088 (0.448)
On-Call - 1 in 2	-1.097*** (0.071)	-1.638*** (0.126)	0.888*** (0.201)
On-Call - 1 in 4 infrequent	0.602*** (0.071)	0.934*** (0.116)	0.939*** (0.129)
Academic - Excellent	0.240*** (0.049)	0.303*** (0.073)	0.707*** (0.141)
Academic - Poor	-0.333*** (0.053)	-0.524*** (0.082)	0.804*** (0.120)
Continuity - Rarely	-0.312*** (0.058)	-0.430*** (0.087)	0.542*** (0.141)
Continuity - Regularly	0.058 (0.062)	0.115 (0.089)	0.732*** (0.133)
Procedural - Enough	0.209*** (0.050)	0.303*** (0.074)	-0.505*** (0.134)
Procedural - None	-0.601*** (0.059)	-0.918*** (0.097)	1.000*** (0.138)
Log L	-2617.29	-2520.88	
BIC	5344.788	5253.71	
Obs	4808	4808	

Notes: Model (1): Multinomial logit (MNL), Model (2) Mixed Logit (MXL). Model (2) assumes normal distribution for all attributes except earnings. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at respondent level. Reference category is Control over hours - Medium, On-Call - 1 in 4, Academic - Average, Continuity - Sometimes, Procedural - Some.

Table 4: Marginal willingness-to-pay (annual \$'000) for changes in specialty attributes

Attribute	(1) MNL	(2) MXL		
	Point-estimate	Mean	S.D.	Interquartile range
Change in hours (%)	-4.22*** (0.43)	-4.11*** (0.41)	-1.60*** (0.61)	[-0.01, 1.02]
Control hours - High	21.53*** (5.88)	20.46*** (5.68)	42.96*** (10.76)	[-1.58, 16.44]
Control hours - Low	-54.75*** (7.00)	-52.68*** (6.49)	-36.14*** (9.88)	[-0.17, 16.36]
On-Call - 1 in 10	74.40*** (8.87)	71.57*** (8.22)	5.96 (30.26)	[-12.20, 38.48]
On-Call - 1 in 2	-114.53*** (9.55)	-111.02*** (8.82)	60.19*** (13.71)	[-0.43, 22.53]
On-Call - 1 in 4 infrequent	62.87*** (8.57)	63.33*** (8.46)	63.64*** (8.28)	[2.88, 16.75]
Academic - Excellent	25.02*** (5.64)	20.56*** (5.30)	47.92*** (9.04)	[-0.80, 14.33]
Academic - Poor	-34.72*** (5.71)	-35.53*** (5.46)	54.49*** (7.90)	[0.13, 13.35]
Continuity - Rarely	-32.59*** (6.90)	-29.16*** (6.32)	36.73*** (9.30)	[0.04, 15.62]
Continuity - Regularly	6.02 (6.38)	7.83 (5.97)	49.62*** (9.26)	[-0.28, 15.24]
Procedural - Enough	21.81*** (5.44)	20.54*** (5.11)	-34.22*** (8.92)	[-0.91, 14.02]
Procedural - None	-62.67*** (7.15)	-62.21*** (6.86)	67.77*** (9.66)	[0.35, 16.52]

Table 5: Mean values of MABEL variables used to inform simulations

Variable	GP	Specialist
Earnings (gross annual \$AUD)	183067	334937
Hours/week	38.8	45.4
Hours of work: very/moderately dissatisfied	0.17	0.28
It is difficult to take time off when I want to: strongly agree	0.39	0.43
The hours I work are unpredictable: agree	0.21	0.44
On-call Ratio	7.66	5.87

Table 6: Model simulations from Model (2)

Attribute	GP	Specialist
Earnings	\$150,000	\$250,000
Change in hours	0	17%
Control over hours	Medium	Low
On-Call	1 in 10	1 in 4
Academic	Poor	Average
Continuity	Regularly	Sometimes
Procedural work	None	Enough

Change in GP attribute	Pr(GP)	Pr(Specialist)
Base case (no change)	0.458	0.542
Increase procedural work to "Some"	0.620	0.380
Increase earnings to \$200,000	0.580	0.420
Increase academic opps to "Average"	0.549	0.451

Table 7: MNL model with educational debt, gender and children interactions

Attributes	Coeff. (S.E.)	Attributes	Coeff. (S.E.)
Earnings (\$'000)	0.009*** (0.001)	On-Call - 1 in 4 infreq	0.511*** (0.114)
x ed debt (\$'000)	0.000* (0.000)	x female	0.170 (0.144)
Change in hours (%)	-0.039*** (0.005)	x children	-0.071 (0.256)
x female	-0.005 (0.006)	Academic - Excellent	0.240*** (0.054)
x children	0.009 (0.012)	Academic - Poor	-0.304*** (0.057)
Control hours - High	0.119 (0.105)	Continuity - Rarely	-0.329*** (0.064)
x female	0.113 (0.126)	Continuity - Regularly	0.057 (0.070)
x children	-0.014 (0.198)	Procedural - Enough	0.163*** (0.055)
Control hours - Low	-0.483*** (0.089)	Procedural - None	-0.655*** (0.065)
x female	-0.003 (0.110)		
x children	-0.003 (0.154)		
On-Call - 1 in 10	0.730*** (0.114)		
x female	-0.010 (0.140)		
x children	-0.146 (0.240)		
On-Call - 1 in 2	-1.013*** (0.124)		
x female	-0.192 (0.156)		
x children	0.155 (0.215)		
Obs		4020	
Log-L		-2174	
BIC		4564	

Table 8: MNL model with personality interactions

Variable	Coeff. (S.E.)	Variable	Coeff. (S.E.)
Earnings (\$'000)	0.009*** (0.001)	On-Call - 1 in 2	-1.069*** (0.096)
x agreeableness	-0.003*** (0.001)	On-Call - 1 in 4 infrequent	0.658*** (0.095)
x openness	0.001 (0.001)	Academic - Excellent	0.224*** (0.066)
x extraversion	-0.001 (0.001)	Academic - Poor	-0.371*** (0.070)
x neuroticism	-0.002*** (0.001)	Continuity - Rarely	-0.341*** (0.075)
Change in hours (%)	-0.043*** (0.004)	x agreeableness	-0.066 (0.059)
Control hours - High	0.170** (0.076)	x openness	0.003 (0.059)
x agreeableness	0.002 (0.075)	x extraversion	-0.090 (0.060)
x openness	0.044 (0.082)	x neuroticism	-0.107* (0.062)
x extraversion	0.105 (0.078)	Continuity - Regularly	0.044 (0.082)
x neuroticism	-0.058 (0.084)	Procedural - Enough	0.138** (0.066)
Control hours - Low	-0.473*** (0.067)	x agreeableness	0.060 (0.064)
x agreeableness	-0.132** (0.062)	x openness	0.121* (0.065)
x openness	0.136* (0.071)	x extraversion	-0.151** (0.062)
x extraversion	0.073 (0.065)	x neuroticism	-0.004 (0.062)
x neuroticism	-0.112* (0.066)	Procedural - None	-0.633*** (0.079)
On-Call - 1 in 10	0.724*** (0.092)	x agreeableness	-0.001 (0.085)
x agreeableness	-0.172*** (0.064)	x openness	0.100 (0.084)
x openness	0.116* (0.070)	x extraversion	-0.090 (0.079)
x extraversion	0.020 (0.074)	x neuroticism	0.274*** (0.081)
x neuroticism	-0.031 (0.061)		
Obs		2789	
Log-L		-2579.6171	
BIC		5485	